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Abstract:    The  theory  of  learning  in  games  studies  how,  which  and  what  kind  of 
equilibria  might  arise  as  a  consequence  of  a  long-run  non-equilibrium  process  of 
learning, adaptation and/or imitation.  If agents’ strategies are completely observed at the 
end  of  each  round,  and  agents  are  randomly  matched  with  a  series  of  anonymous 
opponents, fairly simple rules perform well in terms of the agent’s worst-case payoffs, 
and also guarantee that any steady state of the system must correspond to an equilibrium. 
If (as in extensive-form games) players do not observe the strategies chosen by their 
opponents,  then  learning  is  consistent  with  steady  states  that  are  not  Nash  equilibria 
because players can maintain incorrect beliefs about off-path play.  Beliefs can also be 
incorrect due to cognitive limitations and systematic inferential errors.   Table of Contents 
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Macroeconomics     . Introduction  
This article reviews the literature on non-equilibrium learning in games, with a 
focus on work too recent to have been included in our book The Theory of Learning in 
Games  (1998).  Due to space constraints, the article is more limited in scope, with a 
focus  on  models  of  how  individual  agents  learn,  and  less  discussion  of  evolutionary 
models and models of myopic adjustment.
1 
Much of the modern economics literature is based on the analysis of the equilibria 
of various games, so the issue of when and why to expect observed play to resemble an 
equilibrium is of primary  importance. Rationality  (as defined  for  example by Savage 
(1954)) does not imply that the outcome of a game must be a Nash equilibrium, and 
neither does common knowledge that players  are rational, as  equilibrium requires  all 
players to coordinate on the same equilibrium.  However, game theory experiments show 
that  the  outcome  after  multiple  rounds  of  play  is  often  much  closer  to  equilibrium 
predictions than play in the initial round, which supports the idea that equilibrium arises 
as  a  result  of  players  learning  from  experience.  The  theory  of  learning  in  games 
formalizes this idea, and examines how, which and what kind of equilibrium might arise 
as a consequence of a long-run non-equilibrium process of learning, adaptation and/or 
imitation. Our preferred interpretation and motivation for this work is not that the agents 
are “trying to reach Nash equilibrium,” but rather that they are trying to  maximize their 
own payoff while simultaneously learning about the play of other agents. The question is 
                                                 
1 For recent surveys of evolutionary game theory see Hofbauer & Sigmund (2003) and Sandholm (2009). then when self-interested learning and adaptation will result in some sort of equilibrium 
behavior. 
It is not satisfactory to explain convergence to equilibrium in a given game by 
assuming  an  equilibrium   of  some  larger  dynamic  game  in  which  player 
choose adjustment  or  learning  rules  knowing  the  rules  of  the  other  agents.   For  this 
reason, in the models we survey there are typically some players whose adjustment rule is 
not  a  best  response  to  the  adjustment  rules  of  the  others,  and  so  it  is not  a  relevant 
criticism to say that some player’s adjustment rule is sub-optimal. Instead, the literature 
has developed other criteria for the plausibility of learning rules, such as there not being 
relatively obvious and simple alternatives that would be better.   
The simplest setting in which to study learning is one in which agents’  strategies 
are completely observed at the end of each round, and agents are randomly matched with 
a  series  of  anonymous  opponents,  so  that  the   agents  have  no  impact  on  what  they 
observe. We discuss these sorts of models in section 2.  Section 3 discusses learning in 
extensive-form  games,  where  it  is  natural  to  assume  that  players  do  not  observe  the 
strategies  chosen  by  their  opponents  but  (at  most)  the  sequence  of  actions  that  were 
played.  That  section  also  discusses  models  of  some  frictions  that  may  interfere  with 
learning, such as computational limits or other causes of systematic inferential errors.   
 
2. Learning in Strategic Form Games 
   In this section we consider settings where players do not need to experiment to 
learn. Throughout this section we assume that players know their own payoffs and see the 
action employed by their opponent in each period of a simultaneous move game; the case in  which  players  do  not  know  their  own  payoffs  is  discussed  in  section  3  when  we 
examine extensive form games.  
 The experimental data on how agents learn in games is noisy,
2 so the theoretical 
literature has relied on the idea that people are likely to use rules that perform well in 
situations  of  interest,  and  also  on the  idea  that rules  should  strike a  balance  between 
performance  and  complexity.  In  particular,  simple  rules  perform  well  in  simple 
environments, while  a rule needs more  complexity to do  well when larger  and more 
complex environments are considered. 
Section 2A discusses work on fictitious play and stochastic fictitious play. These 
models are relatively simple, and have the interpretation as the play of a Bayesian agent 
who believes he is facing a stationary environment. These models also “perform well” 
when the environment (in this case, the sequence of opponent's plays) is indeed stationary 
or  at  least  approximately  so.   The  simplicity  of  this  model  gives  it  some  descriptive 
appeal, and also makes it relatively easy to analyze using the techniques of stochastic 
approximation.  However,  with  these  learning  rules  play  only  converges  to  Nash 
equilibrium in some classes of games, and when play does not converge the environment 
is not stationary and the players’ rules may perform poorly. Section 2B discusses  various 
notions  of  “good  asymptotic  performance,”  starting  from  Hannan-consistency,  which 
means doing well in stationary environments, and moving on to stronger conditions that 
ensure  good  performance  in  more  general  settings.  Under  calibration,  which  is  the 
strongest of these concepts, play converges globally to the set of correlated equilibria. 
                                                 
2 There is an extensive literature that tries to identify and estimate the learning rules used by subjects in 
game  theory  experiments,  see  for  example  by  Cheung  &  Friedman  (1997),  Erev  &  Roth  (1998),  and 
Camerer  &  Ho  (1999).  However,  Salmon  (2001)  shows  that  experimental  data  has  little  power  in This leads us to discuss the related question of whether these more sophisticated learning 
rules imply that play always converges to Nash equilibrium. Section 2C discusses models 
where players act as if  they  do not know the payoff matrix, including  reinforcement 
learning models adapted from the psychology literature and models of imitation. It also 
discusses the interpretation of stochastic fictitious play as reinforcement learning. 
2A. Fictitious play and stochastic Fictitious Play  
Fictitious play (FP) and stochastic fictitious play (SFP) are simple stylized models 
of learning. They apply to settings where the agents repeatedly play a fixed strategic-form 
game. The agent knows the strategy spaces and her own payoff function, and observes 
the strategy played by her opponent in each round. The agent acts as if she is facing a 
stationary but unknown (exchangeable) distribution of opponents’ strategies, so she takes 
the distribution of opponents’ play as exogenous. To explain this “strategic myopia,” 
Fudenberg & Kreps (1993) appealed to a “large population model" with many “agents” 
in  each  “player  role.”    Perhaps  the  best  example  of  this  is  the  model  of anonymous 
random matching: Each period all agents are matched to play the game, and are told only 
play in their own match. Agents are unlikely to play their current opponent again for a 
long time, even unlikely to play anyone who played anyone who played her. So if the 
population size is large enough compared to the discount factor, it is not worth sacrificing 
current payoff to influence this opponent's future play.    
                                                                                                                                                 
discriminating between alternative learning models; this is supported by Wilcox (2006)’s finding  that the 
assumption of a representative agent can drive some of the conclusions of this literature.  In FP, players act as if they are Bayesians; they believe that the opponents’ play 
corresponds to draws from some fixed but unknown mixed strategy,
3 and belief updating 
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Fictitious  play  is  any  behavior  rule  that  assigns  actions  to  histories  by  first 
computing 
i
t γ  and then picking any action in  ( )
i i
t BR γ . As noted by Fudenberg & Kreps, 
this  update  rule  corresponds  to  Bayesian  inference  when  player  i  believes  that  the 
distribution  of  opponents’  strategies  corresponds  to  a  sequence  of  i.i.d.  multinomial 
random variables with a fixed but unknown distribution, and player i’s prior beliefs over 
that unknown distribution take the form of a Dirichlet distribution. While this form of the 
prior simplifies the formula for updating beliefs, it is not important for the qualitative 
results; what is important is the implicit assumption that the player treats the environment 
                                                 
3 Note that with the large population interpretation, this belief does not require that any agent actually 
randomizes her play. The belief that opponents play, say, (2/3 L, 1/3 R) is consistent with a state where 2/3 
of the opponents always play L and 1/3 always play R. 
4 For expositional simplicity, we focus on 2-player games here. Fudenberg & Kreps (1993) discussed the 
conceptual issues in extending FP to games with three or more players. as stationary. This ensures that the assessments will converge to the marginal empirical 
distributions. 
If all agents use FP then the actual environment is not stationary unless they start 
at  steady  state,  so  agents  have  the  wrong  model  of  the  world.  But  stationarity  is  a 
reasonable  first  hypothesis  in  many  situations.  This  is  not  to  say,  however,  they  we 
expect  it  to  be  maintained  by  agents  when  it  obviously  fails,  as  for  example,  when 
fictitious  play  generates  high  frequency  cycles.    Consider  following  example  from 
Fudenberg &  Kreps  
 
  A  B 
A  0,0  1,1 
B  1,1  0,0 
 
Suppose there is 1 agent per side, both use FP with initial weights (1, 2) for each player.  
In the 1
st period, both players think the other will play B, so both play A. The next period 
the  weights  are  (2, 2)  and  both  play  B;  the  outcome  is  the  alternating  sequence 
((B.,B),(A,A),(B,B),….).  In  FP  players  only  randomize  when  exactly  indifferent,  so 
typically  per-period play cannot converge to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, but it is 
possible for the empirical frequencies of each player's choices to converge to a mixed 
Nash equilibrium, as they do in this example. However, the realized play is always on the 
diagonal, so both players receive payoff 0 in every period and the empirical distribution 
on action profiles does not equal the product of the two marginal distributions. This does not seem a very satisfactory notion of “converging to an equilibrium,” and it shows the 
drawbacks of identifying a cycle with its average.
5 
Stochastic Fictitious Play 
In the process of  “stochastic fictitious play” or SFP, players form beliefs as in FP 
but choose actions according to a stochastic best response function. One explanation for 
the  randomness  is  that  it  reflects  payoff  shocks  as  in  Harsanyi’s  (1973)  purification 
theorem. Here the payoff to each player or agent i is perturbed by i.i.d. random shocks 
i
t η  that are private information to that agent, and in each period each agent chooses a rule 
mapping  his  type  (realized  payoff)  to  his  strategy.  For  each  distribution 
( )
i i i S
− − − ∈ ∆ ≡ Σ σ  over the actions of i’s opponents, define player i’s best-response 
distribution  (or smooth best response function) 
  ( )( ) Prob[  s.t.   is a best response to  ]
i i i i i i BR s s
− − = σ η σ . 
Any opponent’s play 
i σ
−  induces a unique best response for almost every type, so when 
the distribution of types is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, the  
best-response  distribution  is  indeed  a  function,  and  moreover  it  is  continuous.    For 
example, the logit (or logistic) best response is 
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5 Historically FP was viewed as a thought process by which players might compute and perhaps coordinate 
on  a  Nash  equilibrium  without  actually  playing  the  game  (hence  “fictitious.”)  From  this  perspective, 
convergence to a limit cycle was not problematic, and the early papers focused on finding games in which 
the time average of FP converges. When it does converge, the resulting pair of marginal distributions must 
be a Nash equilibrium. When β  is large this approximates the exact best response correspondence. Fudenberg & 
Kreps (1993) called the intersection of these functions a “Nash distribution,” because it 
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the static Bayesian game corresponding to the 
payoff  shocks;  as  β   goes  to  infinity  the  Nash  distributions  converge  to  the  Nash 
equilibrium of the complete-information game.
6  
As compared to FP, SFP has several advantages: It allows a more satisfactory 
explanation for convergence to mixed-strategy equilibria in fictitious play-like models. 
For example, in matching pennies the per-period play can actually converge to the mixed 
strategy  equilibrium.  In  addition,  SFP  avoids  the  discontinuity  inherent  in  standard 
fictitious play, where a small change in the data can lead to an abrupt change in behavior. 
With SFP, if beliefs converge, play does too. Finally, as we discuss in the next section, 
there is a (non-Bayesian) sense in which stochastic rules perform better than deterministic 
ones: stochastic FP is “universally consistent” (or “Hannan-consistent”) in the sense that 
its time average payoff is at least as good as maximizing against the time-average of 
opponents’ play, which is not true for exact FP.   
For  the  analysis  to  follow,  the  source  of  smooth  best  response  function  is 
unimportant. It is convenient to think of it as having been derived from the maximization 
of a perturbed deterministic payoff function that penalizes pure actions (as opposed the 
stochastic perturbations in the Harsanyi approach). Specifically, if 
i v  is a smooth, strictly 
differentiable, concave function on the interior of 
i Σ  whose gradient becomes infinite at 
the boundary, then 
1 argmax ( , ) ( ) i
i i i i i u v
− − + σ σ σ β σ  is a smooth best response function 
                                                 
6 Note that not all Nash equilibria can approached in this way, think for example of Nash equilibria in 
weakly dominated strategies.  Following McKelvey & Palfrey (1995), Nash distributions have become that assigns positive  probability to each of i's pure strategies; the logit best response 
corresponds to  ( ) ( )log ( ) i
i i i i i i
s v s s = − ∑ σ σ σ . It has been known for a long time that 
the logit model also arises from a random-payoff model where payoffs have the extreme-
value distribution; Hofbauer & Sandholm (2002) extended this. They showed that if the 
smooth best responses are continuously differentiable and are derived from a “simplified 
Harsanyi model” where the random types have strictly positive density everywhere, then 
they can be generated from an “admissible” deterministic perturbation. 
7  
Now we consider systems of agents, all of whom use SFP. The technical insight 
here  is  that  the  methods  of  “stochastic  approximation”  apply,  so  that  the  asymptotic 
properties of these stochastic, discrete-time systems can be understood by reference to a 
limiting continuous time deterministic dynamical system.  There are many versions of the 
stochastic  approximation  result  in  the  literature.  The  following  version  from  Benaim 
(1999) is general enough for the current literature on SFP: Consider the discrete time 
process  on  a  nonempty  convex  subset  X   of 
m R   defined  by  the  recursion 
[ ] 1 (1/( 1)) ( ) n n n n n x x n F x U b + − = + + + ,  and  the  corresponding  continuous  time 
semi-flow  Φ   induced  by  the  system  of  ordinary  differential  equations 
( )/ ( ( )) dx t dt F x t = ,  where  the  n U   are  mean-0,  bounded-variance  error  terms,  and 
                                                                                                                                                 
known in the experimental literature as a quantal response equilibrium, and the logistic smoothed best 
response as the quantal best response. 
7 A key step is the observation that the derivative of the smooth best response is symmetric, and the off-
diagonal terms are negative: a higher payoff shock on i’s first pure strategy lowers the probability of every 
other  pure  strategy.  This  means  the  smooth  best  response  function  has  a  convex  potential  function:  a 
function W (representing maximized expected utility) such that the vector of choice probabilities is the 
gradient  of  the  potential,  analogous  to  the  indirect  utility  function  in  demand  analysis.  Hofbauer  & 
Sandholm  then  show  how  to  use  the  Legendre  transform  of  the  potential  function  to  back  out  the 
disturbance  function.  Note  that  the  converse  of  the  theorem  is  not  true:  some  functions  obtained  by 
maximizing a deterministic perturbed payoff function cannot be obtained with privately observed payoff 
shocks, and indeed Harsanyi had a counterexample. 0 n b → . Under additional technical conditions,
8 there is probability 1 that every ω-limit
9 
of the discrete-time stochastic process lies in a set that is internally chain-transitive for 
Φ .
10 (It is important to note that the stochastic terms do not need to be independent or 
even exchangeable.) 
Benaim & Hirsch (1999) applied stochastic approximation to the analysis of SFP  
in two-player games, with a single  agent in the role of player 1 and a second single agent 
in the role of player 2. The discrete-time system is then    
 
1, 1 1, 1 2, 1, 1, 1,
2, 1 2, 2 1, 2, 2, 2,
(1/( 1))[ ( ) ]
(1/( 1))[ ( ) ]
n n n n n n
n n n n n n
n BR U b
n BR U b
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
+
+
− = + − + +
− = + − + +
, 
where  , i n θ  is player  j ’s beliefs about the play of player i,  the  , i n U  are the mean-zero 
error terms, and the  , i n b  are  asymptotically vanishing error terms that accounts for the 
difference between the player  j ’s beliefs and the empirical distribution of i’s play.
11  
They then used stochastic approximation to relate the asymptotic behavior of the 
system to that of the deterministic system   
     1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 ( ) , ( ) BR BR θ θ θ θ θ θ = − = − ￿ ￿ . 
They also provided a similar result for games with more than two players, still with one 
agent  in  each  population.  Note  that  the  rest  points  of  this  system  are  exactly  the 
                                                 
8  Measurability of the stochastic terms, integrability of the semi-flow, and pre-compactness of the  n x . 
9 The ω -limit set of a sample path { } n θ  is the set of long-run outcomes: y  is in the ω -limit set if there is 
an increasing sequence of periods  { } k n  such that 
k n y → θ  as   k n → ∞. 
10 These are sets that are compact, invariant, and do not contain a proper attractor. 
11 Benaim & Hirsch simplified by ignoring the prior weights so that beliefs are identified with the empirical 
distributions. equilibrium distributions. Thus stochastic approximation says roughly that SFP cannot 
converge to a linearly unstable Nash distribution, and that it has to converge to one of the 
system's internally chain  transitive sets.  
Of course, this leaves open the issue of determining the chain transitive sets for 
various classes of games.  Fudenberg & Kreps (1993) established global convergence to a 
Nash distribution in 2x2 games with a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium; Benaim & 
Hirsch (1999) provided a simpler proof of this, and established that SFP converges to a 
stable,  approximately  pure  Nash  distribution  in  2x2  games  with  two  pure  strategy 
equilibria; they also showed that SFP does not converge in Jordan’s (1993) three-player 
matching pennies  game. Hofbauer  & Sandholm (2002) used the relationship between 
smooth  best  responses  and  deterministic  payoff  perturbations  to  construct  Lyapunov 
function for SFP in zero-sum games and potential games (Monderer & Shapley (1996)) 
and hence prove (under mild additional conditions) that SFP converges to a steady state 
of the continuous time system. Hofbauer and Sandholm derived similar results for a one-
population version of SFP, where two agents per period are drawn to play a symmetric 
game,  and  the  outcome  of  their  play  is  observed  by  all  agents;  this  system  has  the 
advantage of providing an explanation for the “strategic myopia” assumed in SFP. 
Ellison  &  Fudenberg  (2000)  studied  (Unitary)  in  3×3  games,  in  cases  where 
smoothing  arises  from  a  sequence  of  Harsanyi-like  stochastic  perturbations,  with  the 
“size” of the perturbation going to zero. They found that there are many games in which 
whether a purified version of the totally mixed equilibrium is locally stable depends on 
the specific distribution of the payoff perturbations, and that there are some games for 
which no “purifying sequence” is stable. Sandholm (2007) re-examined the stability of purified equilibria under (Unitary); he gave general conditions for stability and instability 
of equilibrium, and shows that there is always at least one stable purification of any Nash 
equilibrium  when  a  larger  collection  of  purifying  sequences  is  allowed.  Hofbauer  & 
Hopkins (2005) proved convergence of (Unitary) in all two-player games that can be 
rescaled to be zero-sum, and in two-player games that can be rescaled to be partnerships. 
They also showed that isolated interior equilibria of all generic symmetric games are 
linearly  unstable  for  all  small  symmetric  perturbations  of  the  best  response 
correspondence, where a “symmetric perturbation” means that the two players have the 
same smoothed best response functions. This instability result applies in particular to 
symmetric versions of the famous example of Shapley (1964), and to non-constant-sum 
variations of the game “rock-scissors-paper.”
12  The overall conclusion seems to be fairly 
optimistic about convergence in some classes of games, and pessimistic in others.  For 
the most part, the above papers motivated (Unitary) as describing the long-run outcome 
of SFP; but Ely & Sandholm (2005) showed that (Unitary) also described the evolution of 
the population aggregates in their model of Bayesian population games.  
Fudenberg & Takahashi (2007) studied “heterogeneous” versions of SFP, with 
many agents in each player role, and each agent only observing the outcome of their own 
match.  The bulk of their analysis assumes that all agents in a given population have the 
same smooth best response function.
13  In the case where there are separate populations 
of “player 1’s” and “player 2’s,” and all agents play every period, the standard results 
                                                 
12 The constant-sum case is one of the non-generic games where the equilibrium is stable. 
13 The perturbations used to generate smoothed best responses may also be heterogeneous. Once this is 
allowed, the beliefs of the different agents can remain slightly different, even in the limit, but a continuity 
argument shows that this has little impact when the perturbations are small. 
 extend  without  additional  conditions.  Intuitively,  since  all  agents  in  population  1  are 
observing  draws  at  the  same  frequency  from  a  common  (possibly  time  varying) 
distribution, they will eventually have the same beliefs. Consequently, it seems natural 
that the set of asymptotic outcomes should be the same as in a system with one agent per 
population. Similar results obtain in a model with “personal clocks,” where a single pair 
of  agents  is  selected  to  play  each  day,  with  each  pair  having  a  possibly  different 
probability  of  being  selected,  provided  that  (a)  the  population  is  sufficiently  large 
compared to the Lipschitz constant of the best-response functions, and (b) the matching 
probabilities of various agents are not “too different.” Under these conditions, although 
different agents observe slightly different distributions, their play is sufficiently similar 
that their beliefs are the same in the long run.  While this provide some support for results 
derived from (Unitary), the condition on the matching probabilities is fairly strong, and 
rules out some natural cases such as interacting only with neighbors; the asymptotics of 
SFP in these cases is an open question.   
Benäim  et  al.  (2007)  extended  stochastic  approximation  analysis  from  SFP  to 
“weighted  stochastic  FP”  in  which  agents  give  geometrically  less  weight  to  older 
observations. Roughly speaking, weighted smooth FP with weights converging to 1 gives 
the same trajectories and limit sets as SFP; the difference is in the speed of motion and 
hence  in  whether  the  empirical  distribution  converges.  They  considered  two  related 
models, both with a single population playing a symmetric game, unitary beliefs, and a 
common smooth best response function. In one model, there is a continuum population, 
all agents are matched each period, and the aggregate outcome  t X  is announced at the 
end  of  period  t.    The  aggregate  common  belief  then  evolves  according  to 1 (1 ) t t t t t x x X + = − + γ γ , where  t γ  is the step size; because of the continuum of agents, 
this is a deterministic system. In the second model, one pair of agents is drawn to play 
each  period,  and  a  single  player’s    realized  action  is  publicly  announced,  all  players 
update  according  to  1 (1 ) t t t t t x x X + = − + γ γ   where  t X   is  the  action  announced  at 
period t.  (Standard SFP has step size  1/( 1) t t = + γ ; this is what makes the system 
“slow down” and leads to stochastic approximation results; it is also why play can cycle 
too slowly for time averages to exist.) 
   Consider the system where only one pair plays at a time. This system is ergodic: 
It has a unique invariant distribution, and the time average of play converges to that 
distribution from any initial conditions.
14 To determine what this invariant distribution is,  
Benäim  et  al.  focus  on  the  case  of  weights  γ   near  0,  where  the  tools  of  stochastic 
approximation can be of use. Specifically, they related the invariant distribution to the 
Birkhoff  center
15  of  the  continuous-time  dynamics  that  stochastic  approximation 
associates with SFP.  Specifically, let  δ ν  denote the invariant distribution for weighting 
1 t = − γ δ , and let  1 ν be an accumulation point of  δ ν as  1 → δ . Benaïm et al show that 
1 ν  is contained in the Birkhoff center of the flow of the smooth best response dynamic. 
They used this, along with other results, to conclude that if the game payoff matrix is 
positive definite in the sense that  0 TA > λ λ  for all non-zero vectors λ that sum to 0, if 
the game has a unique and fully mixed equilibrium  * x , and if the smooth best response 
                                                 
14  This  follows  from  results  of  Norman  (1968).  It  is  enough  to  show  that  the  system  is  “distance 
diminishing” – the distance between two states goes down after any observation – and that from any state 
there is positive probability of getting arbitrarily close to the state (1,0,0,…). 
15 The Birkhoff center of a flow is the closure of the set of points x such that x is contained in the ω -limit 
from x;  it is contained in the union of the internally chain transitive sets. 
 function has the logit form with sufficiently large parameter  β , then the limit invariant 
distribution  1 ν  assigns probability 0 to any Nash distribution that is near  * x . This shows 
that  in  this  game  the  weighted  SFP  does  not  converge  to  the  unique  equilibrium. 
Moreover, under some  additional conditions the iterated limit  , 0 β γ → ∞ →  of the 
average  play  is,  roughly  speaking,  the  same  cycle  that  would  be  observed  in  the 
deterministic system. 
To help motivate their results, Benäim et al.  referred to an experiment of Morgan 
et al. (2006). The game’s equilibria are unstable under SFP, but the aggregate (over time 
and agents) play looks “remarkably close” to NE, which is consistent with the paper’s 
prediction of a stable cycle. As the authors pointed out, the information decay that gives 
the best fit on experimental data is typically not that close to 0, and simply having a lower 
parameter  β in  unweighted  SFP  improves  the  fit  as  well.  As  evidence  against  the 
unweighted rule, Benaïm et al. note that the experimenters report some evidence of auto-
correlation in play; other experiments starting with Cheung & Friedman (1997) have also 
reported evidence that agents discount older observations. It would be interesting to see 
how the autocorrelation in the experiments compares with the autocorrelation predicted 
by weighed SFP, and whether there the subjects were aware of these cycles. 
2B. Asymptotic Performance and Global Convergence 
    SFP treats observations in all periods identically, so it implicitly  assumes that the 
players view the data as exchangeable. It turns out that SFP guarantees that players do at 
least  as  well  as  maximizing  against  the  time  average  of  play,  so  that  when  the 
environment is indeed exchangeable the learning rule “performs well.” However, SFP 
does not require that players identify trends or cycles, which motivates the consideration of more sophisticated learning rules that perform well in a wider range of settings, This in 
turn leads to the question of how to assess the performance of various learning rules.  
From  the  viewpoint  of  economic  theory  it  is  tempting  to  focus  on  Bayesian 
learning  procedures,  but  these  procedures  do  not  have  good  properties  against 
possibilities that have zero prior probability (Freedman, 1965). Unfortunately, any prior 
over  infinite  histories  must  assign  probability  zero  to  “very  large”  collections  of 
possibilities.
16 Worse, in interacting with equally sophisticated (or more sophisticated) 
players,  the  interaction  between  the  players  may  force  play  of  opponents  to  have 
characteristics that were a priori  thought to be impossible,
17 which leads us to consider 
non-Bayesian optimality conditions of various sorts.  
Since  FP  and  SFP  only  tracks  frequencies,  and  not  information  relevant  to 
identifying cycles or other temporal patterns, there is no reason to expect them  to do well 
except  with  respect  to  frequencies,  so  one  relevant  non-Bayesian  criterion  is  to  get 
(nearly) as much utility as if the frequencies are known in advance, uniformly over all 
possible probability laws over observations. If the time average of utility generated by the 
learning rules attains this goal asymptotically, we say that it is “universally consistent” or 
“Hannan  consistent.”  The  existence  of  universally  consistent  learning  rules  was  first 
proved by Hannan (1957) and Blackwell (1956). A variant of this result was rediscovered 
in the computer science literature by Banos (1968) and Megiddo (1980), who showed that 
                                                 
16 If each period has only two possible outcomes, the set of histories is the same as the set of binary 
numbers between 0 and 1. Consider on the unit interval the set consisting of a ball around each rational 
point, where the radius of the k th ball is  2 / r k . This is big in the sense that it is open and dense, but when 
r   is  small  the  set  has  small  Lebesgue  measure.  See  Stinchcombe  (2005)  for  an  analysis  using  more 
sophisticated topological definitions of what it means for a set to be small.  
17 Kalai and Lehrer [1993] rule this out by an assumption that requires a fixed-point-like consistency in the 
players’ prior beliefs. Nachbar [1997] shows that “a priori impossible” play is unavoidable when the priors 
are required to be independent of the payoff functions in the game. there are rules that guarantee a long run average payoff of at least the minmax. The 
existence of universally consistent rules follows also from the Foster & Vohra's (1997) 
result on the existence of universally calibrated rules that we discuss below.  Notice that 
universal consistency says that in matching pennies, if the other player plays heads in odd 
period and tails in even periods, “good performance” is to win half the time, even though 
it would be possible to always win. This is reasonable, as it would only make sense to 
adopt “always win” as the benchmark for learning rules that had the ability to identify 
cycles.   
To  prove  the  existence  of  universally  consistent  rules,  Blackwell  (1956b) 
(discussed  in  Luce  &  Raiffa  (1957))  used  the  concept  of  approachability  that  was 
introduced in Blackwell (1956a). Subsequently Hart & Mas-Colell used approachability 
in a different way to construct a family of universally consistent rules. Benaim et al. 
(2006) further refine this approach, using stochastic approximation results for differential 
inclusions.    For  SFP,  Fudenberg  &  Levine  (1995)  used  a  stochastic  approximation 
argument applied to the difference between the realized payoff and the “consistency” 
benchmark, similar in spirit the original proof of Hannan; subsequently Fudenberg & 
Levine (1999) used a calculation based on the assumption that the smooth best response 
functions are derived from maximizing an perturbed deterministic payoff function, and so 
have symmetric cross partials.
18   
  The Fudenberg & Kreps example shows that FP is not universally  consistent.  
However, Fudenberg & Levine (1995) and Monderer et al. (1997) showed that when FP 
fails to be consistent it must result in the player employing the rule frequently switching back and forth between his strategies. Put differently, the rule will only fail to perform 
well if the opponent plays so as to keep the player near indifferent. Moreover, it is easy to 
see that no deterministic learning rule can be consistent in all games against all possible 
opponent’s rules: For example, in matching pennies given any deterministic rule it is easy 
to construct an opposing rule that beats it in every period.  This suggests that a possible 
fix  would  be  to  randomize  when  nearly  indifferent,  and  indeed  Fudenberg  &  Levine 
(1995) showed that SFP is universally consistent.  
  This universality property (called worst-case analysis in computer science) has 
proven important in the theory of learning, perhaps because it is fairly easy to achieve.  
But getting the frequencies asymptotically right is a weak criterion, as for example it  
allows  a  player  to  ignore  the  existence  of  simple  cycles.  Aoyagi  (1996),  studied  an 
extension of fictitious play in which  agents test the history for “patterns,” which  are 
sequences of outcomes. Agents first check for the pattern of length 1 corresponding to 
yesterday’s outcome, and count how often this outcome has occurred in the past.  Then 
they look at the pattern corresponding to the two previous outcomes, and see how often it 
has occurred, and so on.   Player i  “recognizes” a pattern p at history h if the number of 
its occurrences exceeds an exogenous threshold that is assumed to depend only on the 
length of p. If no pattern recognized, beliefs are the empirical distribution. If one or more 
patterns detected, pick one pattern (rule for picking which one can be arbitrary) and let 
beliefs  be  a  convex  combination  of  the  empirical  distribution  and  the  empirical 
conditional  distribution in  periods  following  this pattern.  He  shows  that  this  form  of 
                                                                                                                                                 
18  The Hofbauer&Sandholm (2002) result mentioned above showed that this same symmetry condition 
applies to smooth best responses generated by stochastic payoff shocks.  pattern detection has no impact on the long-run outcome of the system under some strong 
conditions on the game being played.  
Lambson  & Probst (2004) considered learning rules that are a special case of 
those in Aoyagi’s paper, and derive a result for general games: if the two players use 
equal patterns lengths and exact FP converges, then empirical c.d.f. of play converges to 
the    convex  hull  of  the  set  of  NE.  We  expect  that  detecting  longer  patterns  is  an 
advantage. Lambson and Probst do not have general theorems about this, but they have 
an interesting example: In matching pennies, there is a pair of rules where player 1 has 
pattern length 0, player 2 has pattern length 1, and player 2 always plays a BR to player 
1’s anticipated action.  Note that this claim lets us choose the two rules together. So 
specify that player 2’s prior is that 1 will play T following the first time (H, T) occurs and 
H following the first time (T ,H) occurs . Suppose also that if players are indifferent they 
play  H,  and  that  they  start  out  expecting  opponent  to  play  H.  Then  the  first  period 
outcome is (H,T); next period is (T,H), third period is (H,T) (because 1 plays H when 
indifferent) and so on.
19 
In addition, the basic model of universal consistency can be extended to account 
for some conditional probabilities. This can be done by directly estimating conditional 
probabilities using a sieve as described in Fudenberg & Levine (1999) or by the method 
of “experts” used in computer science. This method, roughly speaking, takes a finite 
collection of different “experts” corresponding to different dynamic models of how the 
data is generated, and shows that asymptotically it is possible in the worst case to do as 
                                                 
19 If we specified that player 2 plays H whenever there is no data for the relevant pattern (e.g. that the 
“prior” for this pattern is that 1 plays T) then player 2 only wins 2/3 of the time.   
 well as the best expert.
20 That is, within the class of dynamic models considered, there is 
no reason to do less well than the best.  
Calibration 
  While universal consistency seems an attractive property for a learning rule, it is  
fairly  weak.  Foster  &  Vohra  (1997)  introduced  learning  rules  that  are  derived  from 
calibrated  forecasts.  Calibrated  forecasts  can  be  explained  in  the  setting  of  weather 
forecasts: Suppose that a weather forecaster sometimes says there is a 25% chance of 
rain, sometimes a 50% chance, and sometimes a 75% chance. Then looking over all his 
past forecasts, if on all the days when he said 25% chance of rain it actually rained 25% 
of the time, when he said 50% it rained 50% of the time and when he said 75% it rained 
75% of the time, we would say that he was well calibrated. As Dawid (1985) pointed out, 
no deterministic forecast rule is calibrated in all environments; but just as with the related 
concept  of  universal  consistency,  calibration  can  be  achieved  with  randomization,  as 
shown  by  Foster  and  Vohra  (1998).  Calibration  seems  a  desirable  property  for  a 
forecaster  to  have,  and  there  is  some  evidence  that  weather  forecasters  are  in  fact 
reasonably  well  calibrated  (Murphy  &  Winkler,  1977),  but  the  extent  to  which 
experimental  subjects  are  well  calibrated  about  their  answers  to  trivia  questions  (e.g. 
“what is the area of Nigeria?”) is under dispute (see e.g. Gigerenzer et al. (1991)).     
  In a game or decision problem, the question corresponding to calibration is: on all 
the occasions where a player took a particular action, how good a response was it? Put 
                                                 
20 This work was initiated by Vovk (1990); it and subsequent developments are summarized in Fudenberg 
& Levine (1998). There are also a few papers in computer science that analyze other models of cycle 
detection combined with exact as opposed to smooth fictitious play. 
 differently, choosing action A is a “prediction” that it is a best response. If we take the 
frequency of opponents’ play on all those periods where that prediction was made, we 
can ask: “was A actually a best response in those periods?” Or as in Hart and Mas-Colell 
(2000) we can measure this by regret: How much loss has the player suffered in those 
periods by playing A rather than the actual best response to the frequency over those 
periods? If, regardless of opponents’ play the player is asymptotically calibrated in the 
sense that the time average regret for each action goes to zero, we say that the player is 
universally calibrated. Foster & Vohra (1997) showed that there are learning procedures 
that have this property, and moreover that if all players follow such rules the time average 
of the frequency of play must converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. 
Because  the  algorithm  originally  used  by  Foster  and  Vohra  involved  a 
complicated procedure of finding stochastic matrices and their eigenvectors, one might 
ask  whether  it  is  a  good  approximation  to  assume  that  players  follow  universally 
calibrated rules.  The “universal” aspect of universal calibration makes it impossible to 
empirically verify without knowing the actual rules that players use, but it is conceptually 
easy to tell whether learning rules are calibrated along the path of play: If they are, the 
time average of joint play converges to the set of correlated equilibria. If to the contrary 
some  player  is  not  calibrated  along  the  path  of  play,  she  might  notice  that  the 
environment is negatively correlated with her play, which should lead her to second-
guessing her planned actions. For example, if it never rains when the agent carries an 
umbrella, she might think along the following lines: “I was going to carry an umbrella, so 
that means it will be sunny, so I should not carry an umbrella after all.” Just like failures of stationarity, some forms of non-calibration are more subtle and difficult to detect, but 
even so  universally calibrated learning rules need not be exceptionally complex. 
We will not focus on the algorithm of Foster and Vohra. Subsequent research has 
greatly  expanded  the  set  of  rules  known  to  be  universally  calibrated,  and  greatly 
simplified  the  algorithms  and  methods  of  proof.  In  particular,  universally  consistent 
learning rules may be used to construct universally calibrated learning rules by solving a 
fixed-point problem, which roughly corresponds to solving the fixed point problem of 
second  guessing  whether  to  carry  an  umbrella.  This  fixed  point  problem  is  a  linear 
problem that is solved by inverting a matrix, as shown in Fudenberg & Levine (1998); the 
bootstrapping approach was subsequently generalized by Hart & Mas-Colell (2000). 
  Although inverting a matrix is conceptually simple, one may still wonder whether 
it is simple enough for people to do in practice.  Consider the related problem of arbitrage 
pricing, which also involves inverting a matrix. Obviously people tried to arbitrage before 
there were computers or simple matrix inversion routines. Whatever method they used 
seems to have worked reasonably well, because examination of price data does not reveal 
large arbitrage opportunities (see e.g. Black & Scholes (1971) and Moore & Juh (2006).) 
That actual matrix inversion works better may be seen by the fact that large Wall Street 
arbitrage  firms  do  not  invert  matrices  by  the  seat  of  their  pants,  but  by  explicit 
calculations on a computer.
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We  should  also  point  out  the  subtle  distinction  between  being  calibrated  and 
universally  calibrated.  For  example,  Hart  &  Mas-Colell  (2001)  examined  simple 
algorithms  that  lead  to  calibrated  learning,  even  though  they  are  not  universally calibrated.  Formally  the  fixed  point  problem  that  needs  to  be  solved  for  universal 
calibration has the form  T Rq R q =  where q  are the probabilities of choosing different 
strategies, and R is a matrix in which each row is the probability over actions derived by 
applying a universally consistent procedures to each conditional history of a players own 
play. Suppose in fact the player played action a last period. Let  µ  be a large number, 
and consider then defining current probabilities by 
 




R a b b a
q b
b a q c
µ
≠
 ≠    =   = −    ∑
. 
Although this rule is not universally calibrated, Hart & Mas-Colell (2000) showed that it 
is calibrated provided everyone else uses similar rules. Cahn (2001) showed that the rule 
is also  calibrated provided that everyone else uses rules that change actions at a similar 
rate. Intuitively, if other players do not change their play very quickly the procedure 
above implicitly inverts the matrix needed to solve  T Rq R q = .  
Testing 
One  interpretation  of  calibration  is  that  the    “learner”  has  passed  a  test  for 
learning, namely getting the frequencies right asymptotically, even though the “learner” 
started by knowing nothing. This has led to a literature that asks when and whether a 
person ignorant of the true law generating signals could fool a tester. Sandroni (2003) 
proposed two properties for a test: it should declare pass/fail after a finite number of 
periods, and it should pass the truth with high probability. If there is an algorithm that can 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 The ability to implement sophisticated algorithms, both on modern computers and within the brain, 
shows the limitations of conclusions based on fMRI studies of simple learning tasks.   pass  the  test  with  high  probability  without  knowing  the  truth,  Sandroni  says  that  it 
ignorantly passes the test. Sandroni showed that for any set of tests that give an answer in 
finite  time  and  pass  the  truth  with  high  probability,  there  is  an  algorithm  that  can 
ignorantly pass the test. 
Subsequent work has shown some limitations of this result. Dekel & Feinberg 
(2006)  and  Olszeiwski  &  Sandroni  (2006)  relaxed  the  condition  that  the  test  yield  a 
definite  result  in  finite  time.  They  showed  that  such  a  test  can  screen  out  ignorant 
algorithms,  but  only  by  using  counter-factual  information.  Fortnow  &  Vohra  (2008) 
showed  that  an  ignorant  algorithm  that  passes  certain  tests  must  necessarily  be 
computationally complex, and Al-Najjar & Weinstein (2007) who showed that it is much 
easier to distinguish which of two learners is informed than to evaluate one learner in 
isolation.  Feinberg  &  Stewart  (2007)  consider  the  possibility  of  comparing  many 
different  experts,  some  real  and  some  false,  and  show  that  only  the  true  experts  are 
guaranteed to pass the test no matter what the other experts do. 
Convergence to Nash Equilibrium  
  There are two reasons we are interested in convergence to Nash equilibrium. First, 
Nash equilibrium is widely used in game theory, so it is important to know when learning 
rules do and do not lead to Nash equilibrium. Second, Nash equilibrium (in a strategic 
form  game)  can  be  viewed  as  characterizing  situations  where  no  further  learning  is 
possible; conversely when learning rules do not converge to Nash equilibrium some agent 
could gain by using a more sophisticated rule.  
This  question  has  been  examined  by  examining  a  class  of  learning  rules  to 
determine whether Nash equilibrium is reached when all players employ learning rules in the class. For example, we have seen that if all players employ universally calibrated 
learning rules, then play converges to the set of correlated equilibrium. But this means 
that players may be correlating their play through the use of time as a correlating device, 
and why should players not learn this? In particular, are there classes of learning rules 
that when employed by all players lead to global convergence to a Nash equilibrium? 
  Preliminary  results  in  this  direction  were  negative.  Learning  rules  are  called 
“uncoupled” if the equation of motion for each player does not depend on the payoff 
function of the other players. (It can of course depend on their actual play.)  Hart & Mas-
Colell  (2003)  showed  that  uncoupled  and  stationary  deterministic  continuous-time 
adjustment  systems  cannot  be  guaranteed  to  converge  to  equilibrium  in  a  game;  this 
result  has  the  flavor  of  Saari  &  Simon’s  (1978)  result  that  price  dynamics  that  are 
uncoupled across markets cannot converge to Walrasian equilibrium.  Hart & Mas-Colell 
(2006)  proved  that  convergence  to  equilibrium  cannot   be  guaranteed  in  stochastic 
discrete-time adjustment procedures in the “1-recall” case where the state the system is 
the most recent profile of play. They also refine the past convergence result of Foster & 
Young  by  showing  that    convergence  can  be  guaranteed  in  stochastic  discrete-time 
systems where the state corresponds to play in the preceding two periods. 
  Despite this negative result, there may be uncoupled stochastic rules that converge 
probabilistically to Nash equilibrium, as shown in a pair of papers by Foster and Young 
Their first  (2003)  paper  on  this  topic  showed  the  possibility  of  convergence  with 
uncoupled rules. However, the behavior prescribed by the rules strikes us as artificial and 
poorly motivated. However, their (2006) obtained the same result with rules that are more 
plausible. Further results can be found in Young (2008).   In the Foster & Young stochastic learning model the learning procedure follows a 
“status quo” action which it re-evaluates periodically. These re-evaluations take place at 
infrequent  random  times.  During  the  evaluation  period,  some  other  action,  randomly 
chosen with probability uniformly bounded away from zero, is employed instead of the 
status quo action. That the times of re-evaluation are random assures a fair comparison 
between the payoffs of the two actions. If the status quo is “satisfactory” in the sense that 
the alternate action does not do too much better, it is continued on the same basis (being 
reevaluated again). If it fails then the learner concludes that the status quo action was 
probably not a very good action. However, rather than adopting the alternative action, the 
learner goes back to the drawing board and picks a new status quo action at random. 
We  have  already  seen  that  if  we  drop  the  requirement  of  convergence  in  all 
environments, sensible procedures such as fictitious play converge in many interesting 
environments,  for  example  in  potential  games.  A  useful  counterpoint  is  the  Shapley 
counterexample discussed earlier, in which stochastic fictitious play fails to converge but 
instead approaches a limit cycle. Along this cycle, players act as if the environment is 
constant, failing to anticipate the fact that their opponent’s play is changing. This raises 
the possibility of a more sophisticated learning rule in which players attempt to forecast 
each other’s future moves. This type of model was first studied in Levine (1991), who 
showed that players who were not myopic, but somewhat patient, would move away from 
Nash equilibrium as they recognized the commitment value of their actions. Dynamics in 
the purely myopic setting of attempting to forecast the opponent’s next play, is studied in 
Shamma & Arslan (2005). To motivate the Shamma & Arslan model, consider the environment of smooth 
fictitious  play  with  exponential  weighting  of  past  observations,
22  which  has  the 
convenient property of being time homogeneous, and limit attention to the case of two 
players. Let λ be the exponential weight and let  ( ) i z t  be the vector over actions of player 
i that takes on the value 1 for the action taken in period t  and 0 otherwise. Then the 
empirical weight frequency of player  ' i s  play is  ( ) (1 ) ( 1) ( 1) i i i t z t t σ λ λσ = − − + − . 
In  SFP,  at  time  t   player  i  plays  a  smoothed  best  response  ( ( 1)) i i t β σ− −   to  this 
empirical frequency. However,  ( 1) i t σ− −  measures what  i −  did in the past, not what 
she is doing right now. So it is natural to think of extrapolating  i − ’s past play to get a 
better  estimate  of  her  current  play.  Shamma  &  Arslan,  motivated  by  the  use  of 
“proportional  derivative  control”  to  obtain  control  functions  with  better  stability 
properties,  introduce an auxiliary variable  i r−  with which to do this extrapolation. This 
auxiliary variable tracks  i σ− , so changes in the auxiliary variable can be used to forecast 
changes  in  i σ− .  Specifically,  suppose  that 
( ) ( 1) ( ( 1) ( 1)) i i i i r t r t t r t λ σ − − − − = − + − − − , that is  i r−  adjusts to reduce the distance 
to  i σ− .  The  extrapolation  procedure  is  then  to  forecast  player  i − ’s  play  as 
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) i i i t r t r t σ γ − − − − + − − , the case  0 γ =  corresponding to the exponentially 
weighted  FP,  0 > γ   corresponds  to  giving  some  weight  to  the  estimate  ( ) r t   of  the 
derivative. This estimate is essentially the most recent increment in  i σ−  when λ  is very 
large; smaller values of  λ  correspond to smoothing by considering past increments as 
well. 
                                                 
22 They use a more complicated derivation from ordinary fictitious play. Motivated  by  stochastic  approximation,  (which  requires  the  exponential 
weighting  in  beliefs  be  close  to  1)  Shamma  and  Arslan  then  propose  to  study  the 
continuous  time  analog  of  this  system.  For  the  evolution  of  the  state  variable 
[ ] ( ) i i i i i r σ φ β σ γ σ − − = + − ￿ ￿ ,  which  comes  from  taking  the  expected  value  of  the 
adjustment equation for the weighted average, where φ  is the exponential weight.
23 The 
equation of motion for the auxiliary variable is just  ( ) i i i r r λ σ − − − = − ￿ . 
From  the  auxiliary  equation  ( ) i i i r r λ σ − − − = − ￿ ￿￿ ￿   so  that  i r− ￿   will  be  a  good 
estimate of  i σ− ￿  if  i r− ￿￿  is small. When  i r− ￿￿  is small Shamma & Arslan show that the 
system globally converges to a Nash equilibrium distribution.  However, there are not 
good known conditions on fundamentals that guarantee this result. What is true, that in 
some cases of practical interest, such as the Shapley example, simulations show that the 
system does converge. 
2C. Reinforcement Learning , Aspirations,  and Imitation  
Now we consider the non-equilibrium dynamics of various forms of boundedly-
rational learning, starting with models in which players act as if they do not know the 
payoff matrix,
24  and do not observe (or do not respond to) opponent’s actions.  We then 
go on to models that assume players do respond to data such as the relative frequency and 
payoffs of the strategies that are currently in use.    
                                                 
23 It should be noted that Shamma & Arslan (2005) choose the units of time so that 1 φ = . In these time 
units,  it  takes  one  unit  of  time  to  reach  the  best  response,  so  that  choosing  1 γ =   means  that  the 
extrapolation attempts to “guess” what other players will be doing at the time full adjustment to the best 
response takes place. Shamma and Arslan give a special interpretation to this case, which they refer to as 
“system inversion.” 
24 This behavior might arise either because players do not have this information or because they ignore it 
due to cognitive limitations However, there is evidence that providing information on opponents’ actions Reinforcement learning has a long history in the psychology literature. Perhaps 
the  simplest  model  of  reinforcement  learning  is  the  cumulative  proportional 
reinforcement” or “CPR” studied by Laslier et al. (2001). In this process, utilities are 
normalized to be positive, and the agent starts out with initial weights  (1) k CU to each 
action k. Thereafter, the process updates the score (also called a propensity) of the action 
that was played by its realized payoff, and does not update the scores of other actions.  
The probability of action k at time  t  is then  ( )/ ( ) k j
j
CU t CU t ∑ . Note that the “step 
size” of this process – the amount that the score is updated – is stochastic, and depends on 
the history to date, in contrast to the 1/t  increment in beliefs for a Bayesian learner in a 
stationary environment. 
25 
With this rule, every action is played infinitely often: The cumulative score of 
action k  is at least its initial value, and the sum of the cumulative payoffs at time t  is at 
most the initial sum plus t times the maximum payoff.  Thus the probability of action k  
at time t  is at least  /( ) a b ct +  for some positive constants  , , a b c and so the probability 
of never playing k  after time t is bounded by the product  (1 /( )) 0
t a b c
∞
= − + = ∏τ τ . 
To analyze the process further, Laslier et al. used results on “urn models”: the 
state space is the number of balls of each type, and each period 1 ball is added, so that the 
step size is 1/t .  Here the balls correspond to the possible action profiles 
1 2 ( , ) a a , and 
the state space has dimension 
1 2 # # A A i  equal to the number of distinct action profiles. 
                                                                                                                                                 
does change the way players adapt their play, see Weber (2003). Börgers et al. (2004) characterizes 
“monotone” learning rules for settings when players observe only their own payoff. 
25 Erev &  Roth (1999) study a perturbed version of this model where every action receives a small positive 
reinforcement in every period; Hopkins (2002) studies a normalized version of the Er’ev and Roth process 
where the step size is deterministic and of order 1/t. The point is that the number of occurrences of a given joint outcome can increase by at 
most rate 1/t , and the number of times that each outcome has occurred is a sufficient 
statistic for the realized payoffs and the associated cumulative utility. One can then use 
stochastic approximation techniques to derive the associated ODE  ( ) x x r x = − + ￿ , where 
x  is the fraction of occurrences of each type, and r is the probability of each profile as a 
function of the current state.   
Laslier  et  al.  showed  that  when  “player  2”  is  an  exogenous  fixed  distribution 
played by Nature, the ODE converges to the set of maximizing actions from any interior 
point, and moreover that the stochastic discrete-time CPR model does the same thing. 
Intuitively, the fact that the system cannot lock on to the wrong action comes from the 
facts that every action is played infinitely often (so that players can learn the value of 
each action) and that the step size converges to 0. Laslier et al. also analyzed systems 
with two agents, each using CPR (and so acting as if they were facing a sequence of 
randomly drawn opponents). Some of their proofs were based on incorrect applications of 
results on stochastic approximation due to problems on the boundary of the simplex; 
Beggs (2005) and Hopkins & Posch (2005) provided the necessary additional arguments, 
showing that even in the case of boundary rest points, reinforcement learning does not 
converge to equilibria that are unstable under the replicator dynamic, and in particular 
cannot  converge  to  non-Nash  states.  Beggs  showed  that  the  reinforcement  model 
converges  to  equilibrium  in  constant-sum  2x2  games  with  a  unique  equilibrium,  and 
Hopkins  &  Posch  showed  convergence  to  a  pure  equilibrium  in  rescaled  partnership 
games.  Since  generically  every  2x2  game  is  either  a  rescaled  partnership  game  or  a 
rescaled constant-sum game, what these results leave open is the question of convergence in games that are rescaled constant sum but not constant sum without the rescaling; work 
in progress by Hofbauer establishes that reinforcement learning does converge in all 2x2 
games.   
Hopkins  (2002)  studied  several  “perturbed”  versions  of  CPR  with  slightly 
modified updating rules; in one version the update rule is the same as CPR except that the 
each period the score of every action is updated by an additional small amount λ.  Using 
stochastic approximation, he related the local stability properties of this process to that of 
a perturbed replicator dynamic. He showed (roughly speaking) that if a completely mixed 
equilibrium is locally stable for all smooth best response dynamics, it is locally stable for 
the  perturbed  replicator,  and  that  if  an  equilibrium  is  unstable  for  all  smooth  best 
response dynamics, it is unstable for the perturbed replicator.
26 He also obtained a global 
convergence result for a  “normalized” version of perturbed CPR where the step size per 
period is 1/t  independent of the history.  
Börgers & Sarin (1997) analyzed a related (unperturbed) reinforcement model, 
where amount of reinforcement does not slow down over time but is instead a fraction γ , 
so that in a steady state environment the cumulative utility of every action that is played 
infinitely often converges to its expected value. Because the system does not slow down 
over time,  the fact that each action is played infinitely often does not imply that the agent 
learns the right choice in a stationary environment, and indeed the system has positive 
probability of converging to a state where the wrong choice is made in every period.  At a 
technical level, stochastic approximation results for systems with decreasing steps do not 
apply to systems with a constant step size. Instead, Börgers and Sarin looked at the limit of  the  process  as  the  adjustment  speed  γ   goes  to  0,  and  show  that  over  finite  time 
horizons the trajectories of the process converge to that of its mean field, which is the 
replicator dynamic. (The asymptotics are however different: for example in matching 
pennies the reinforcement model will eventually be absorbed at a pure strategy profile, 
while the replicator dynamic will not.) Börgers and Sarin (2000) extended this model to 
allow the amount of reinforcement to depend on the agent’s “aspiration level.”  In some 
cases, the system does better with an aspiration level than in the base Börgers & Sarin 
(1997) model, but aspiration levels can also lead to suboptimal “probability-matching” 
outcomes.
27 
It is worth mentioning that an inability to observe opponent’s actions does not 
make it impossible to implement SFP, or related methods, such as universally calibrated 
algorithms. In particular, in SFP what matters is the utility of different alternatives. For 
example, in the exponential case 
'
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β σ  
it is not important that the player observe  i σ− , he merely needs to see  ( , ) i i u s σ− , and 
there are a variety of ways to use historical data on the player’s own payoffs to infer 
this.
28 Moreover we conjecture that the asymptotic behavior of a system where agents 
                                                                                                                                                 
26  As mentioned in section 2A, two “small perturbations” of the same best response function can have 
differing implications for local stability.  
27 At one time psychologists believed that probability matching was a good description of human behavior, 
but subsequent research showed that behavior moves away from probability matching if agents are offered 
monetary rewards or simply given enough repetitions of the choice. (Lee, 1971). 
28 See Fudenberg &  Levine (1998) and Hart & Mas-Colell (2001). learn in this way will be the same as with SFP, though the relative probabilities of the 
various attractors may change, and the speed of convergence will be slower.  
Reinforcement  learning  requires  only  that  the  agent  observe  his  own  realized 
payoffs.  Several  papers  suppose  that  agents  can  access  the  actions  and  perhaps  the 
payoffs of other members of the population, and thus can imitate the actions of those they 
observe. Björnerstedt & Weibull (1996) studied a deterministic, continuum-population 
model,  where  agents  receive  noisy  statistical  information  about  the  payoff  of  other 
strategies,  and  switch  to  the  strategy  that  appears  to  be  doing  the  best.    Binmore  & 
Samuelson (1997) studied a model of imitation with fixed aspirations in a large finite 
population playing a 2x2 game.
29 In the unperturbed version of the model, each period, 
one agent receives a “learn draw” and compares the payoff of his current strategy against 
the sum of a fixed aspiration level and an i.i.d. noise term.  (The agent plays an infinite 
number  of  rounds  between  each  learn  draw  so  that  this  payoff  corresponds  to  the 
strategy’s current expected value.) If the payoff is above the target level the agent sticks 
with his current strategy, otherwise he imitates a randomly chosen individual.  In the 
perturbed  process,  the  agent  “mutates”  to  the  other  strategy  with  some  fixed  small 
probability  λ . Binmore & Samuelson characterized the iterated limit of the invariant 
distribution of the perturbed process as first the population size  goes to infinity and then 
the mutation rate shrinks to 0. In a coordination game this limit will always select one of 
the two pure-strategy equilibria, but the risk dominant equilibrium need not be selected, 
                                                 
29 Fudenberg and Imhof (2008) generalize their assumptions and extend the analysis to games with an 
arbitrary finite number of actions. because the selection procedure reflects not only the size of the “basins of attraction” of 
the two equilibria, but also the strength of the learning flow. 
30  
 A similar finding arises in the study of the frequency-dependent Moran process 
(Nowak  et  al.,  2004)  which  represents  a  sort  of  imitation  of  successful  strategies 
combined with the imitation of popular ones: When an agent changes his strategy, he 
picks a new one based on the product of the strategy’s current payoff and its share of the 
population,  so  that  if  all  strategies  have  the  same  current  payoff,  the  probabilities  of 
adoption exactly equal the population shares, while if one strategy has a much higher 
payoff, its probability of being chosen can be close to one. In the absence of  mutations ot 
other  perturbations,  the  Binmore  &  Samuelson  (1997)  and  the  Nowak  et  al.  (2004) 
models both have the property that every “homogeneous” state where all agents play the 
same strategy is absorbing, while every state where two or more strategies are played is 
transient. Fudenberg & Imhof (2006) gave a general algorithm for computing the limit 
invariant  distribution  in  these  sorts  of  models  for  a  fixed  population  size  as  the 
perturbation goes to 0, and applied it to 3x3 coordination games and to the model of 
Nowak  et  al.  Benaïm  &  Weibull  (2003)  provided  mean  field  results  for  the  large-
population limit of a more general class of systems, where the state corresponds to a 
mixed strategy profile, only one agent changes play per period, and the period length 
goes to 0 as the population goes to infinity.    
Karandikar et al. (1998), Posch & Sigmund (1999), and Cho & Matsui (2004) 
analyzed endogenous aspirations and inertia in two-action games. In their models, a fixed 
pair of agents play each other repeatedly; the agents tend to play the action they played in 
                                                 
30 See Fudenberg and Harris (1992) for a discussion of the relative importance of the size of the basin and the previous period unless their realized payoff is less than their aspiration level, where 
the  aspiration  level  is  the  average  of  the  agent’s  realized  payoffs.
31  In  Posch  and 
Sigmund, the behavior rule is simple: if the payoff is at least the aspiration level, then 
play the same action with probability  1 ε −  and switch; symmetrically, if the realized 
payoff is less than the aspiration level then switch with probability 1 ε − .  In Krandikar 
et al, the agent never switches if his realized payoff is at least the aspiration level; as the 
payoff drops below the aspiration the probability of switching falls continuously to a 
lower bound p.  Cho & Matsui also considered a smooth increasing switching function; in 
contrast to Krandikar et al. is they assume that there is a strictly positive probability of 
switching if the payoff is in a neighborhood of the current aspiration level.  
The key aspect of these models is that because the aspirations update at rate 1/t , 
they eventually move much more slowly than behavior.  This allows Cho & Matsui to 
apply  stochastic  approximation  techniques  and  relate  the  asymptotic  behavior  of  the 
system to that of the system  a a u a = − ￿ , where a is the vector of aspiration levels, and 
a u  is the vector of average payoffs induced by the current aspiration level. (This vector is 
unique because each given aspiration level corresponds to an irreducible Markov matrix 
on actions.
32)  Cho & Matsui concluded that their model leads to coordination on the 
Pareto-efficient  equilibrium  in  a  symmetric  coordination  game,  and  that  play  can 
converge to “always cooperate” in the prisoner’s dilemma, provided that the gain from 
cheating is sufficiently small compared to the loss incurred when the other player cheats. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the cost of “swimming against the flow.”  
31 Posch & Sigmund also analyze a variant where the aspiration level is yesterdays’s payoff, as oppsed to 
the long-run average. Karandikar et al. focus on an extension of the model where aspirations are updated 
with noise. Krandikar et al. obtained a similar result, except that it holds regardless of the gain to 
cheating: the difference comes from the fact that in their model agents who are satisfied 
stick with their current action with probability 1.  
In these models, players do not explicitly take into account the fact that they are in 
a repeated interaction, but cooperation nonetheless occurs.
33 It is at least as interesting to 
model repeated interactions when players explicitly respond to their opponent’s play, but 
the strategy space in a repeated game is large, so analyzes of learning dynamics have 
typically  either  restricted  attention  to  a  small  subset  of  the  possible  repeated  game 
strategies or analyzed related games where the strategy space is in fact small. The first 
approach has a long tradition in evolutionary biology, going back to the work of Axelrod 
&  Hamilton  (1981).  Nowak  et  al.  (2004)  and  Imhof  et  al.  (2005)  adopted  it  in their 
applications of the Moran process to the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: The first paper 
considers only the two strategies “Always Defect” and “Tit for Tat”, and shows that Tit 
for Tat is selected, essentially because its basin becomes vanishingly small when the 
game is played a large number of rounds. The second paper adds in the strategy “always 
C,” which is assumed to have a small complexity-cost advantage over Tit for Tat; the 
result is cycles that spend most of the time near “All Tit for Tat” if the population and the 
number of rounds are large.
34 Jehiel (1999) considers a different sort of simplification: he 
supposes that players only care about payoffs for the next k periods, and believe that their 
opponent’s play only depends on the outcomes in the past m periods.  
                                                                                                                                                 
32 In Posch and Sigmund, behavior is not a continuous function of the state, but they use simulations to 
support the use of a similar equation.   
33 It is often possible to do  well by being less than  fully  rational. This is especially important  where 
precommitment is an issue: here it is advantageous for opponents to think you are irrationally committed. 
An interesting example of such a learning rule and a typical result can be found in Acemoglu & Yildiz 
(2001). Instead of imposing restrictions on the strategy space or beliefs, one can consider 
an overlapping generations framework where players play just once, as in the “gift-giving 
game,” where young people may give a gift to an old person. Payoffs are such that it is 
preferable to give a gift when young and receive one when old then to neither give nor 
receive a gift. This type of setting was originally studied without learning by Kandori 
(1992) who allowed “information systems” to explicitly carry signals about past play, and 
proved  a  folk  theorem  for  a  more  general  class  of  overlapping-generations  games. 
Johnson,  Pesendorfer  &  Levine  (2001)  showed  that  a  simple  red/green  two  signal 
information system can be used to sustain cooperation and that this emerges as the limit  
of the invariant distribution under the myopic best response dynamic with mutations. 
Nowak & Sigmund (1998a, b) offered an interpretation of Kandori’s information systems 
as a public image, and use simulations of a discrete-time replicator process to argue that 
play converges to a cooperative outcome. 
Pesendorfer & Levine (2007) studied equilibrium selection a related game under 
the “relative best reply dynamic,” which says that players select best reply to the current 
state among the strategies that are currently active. To make the process ergodic, they 
assume  that  there  are  small  perturbations  corresponding  both  to  imitation  (copy  a 
randomly chosen agent) and mutation, with imitation much more likely than mutation, 
Pesendorder  and  Levine then  analyzed  the  limiting  invariant  distribution  in  games  in 
which  player  simultaneously  receive  signals  of  each  other’s  “intentions”  and  use 
strategies that simultaneously indicate intention and respond to signals about the other 
player’s intention. These games always have trivial equilibria in which the signals are 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 The result requires that the number of rounds is large given the population size. ignored. Depending on how strong the signal is, there can be more cooperative equilibria. 
For example if players receive a perfect indication of whether their opponent is using the 
same strategy as they are, then the strategy of maximizing joint utility when the opponent 
is the same, but minmaxing the difference in utilities when the opponent is different is an 
equilibrium. Moreover, Pesendorfer and Levine showed that this equilibrium is selected n 
the limit of small perturbations. 
3. Learning in Extensive-Form Games  
3A. Information and Experimentation  
In many settings with simultaneous moves, it seems natural for each player to 
observe the strategies used by each of his opponents after each play of the game. In 
extensive-form  games,  it  seems  more  natural  to  assume  that  players  observe  at  most 
which terminal nodes are reached, so that they do not observe how their opponents would 
have played at information sets that were not reached. To begin, we will briefly review 
the earliest work on this topic, which is based on the idea that if a player never plays a 
specific action, he may never observe how his opponents react to it, so incorrect beliefs 
about off-path play could persist, and play might converge to a non-Nash outcome.  
More precisely, incorrect beliefs about off-path play can persist unless for some 
reason players obtain “enough” observations of off-path play. This raises three questions: 
1) What outcomes can persist if there are very few observations of off-path play? 2) How 
much of off-path play is needed to imply that any long-run outcome satisfy the conditions 
of standard equilibrium conditions such as Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium? 
3) How much off-path play will in fact occur under various models of learning? The answer to what types of outcomes can persist in the absence of information 
about off-path play is given by the notion of self-confirming equilibrium (SCE). There 
are several versions of SCE. The most straightforward to define is that of unitary SCE. 
This requires that each player have beliefs  i µ  over opponents play (ordinarily the space 
of their behavior strategies) that satisfies two basic criteria. First, players should optimize 
relative to their beliefs. Second, beliefs should be correct at those information sets on the 
game tree that are reached with positive probability. Put differently, the beliefs must 
assign probability one to the set of opponent behavior strategies that are consistent with 
actual play at those information sets. Even this version of SCE allows outcomes that are 
not Nash equilibria, as shown by an example of Fudenberg & Kreps (1988), but it is 
outcome-equivalent to Nash equilibrium in 2 player games (Battigalli (1987), Fudenberg 
& Kreps, (1995)).
35 One important variation on this basic definition, is the concept of 
heterogeneous SCE, which applies when there is a population of agents in each player 
role, so that different agents in the same player role can have different beliefs, but the 
beliefs of each  agent must be consistent with what the agent observes given its own 
choice of pure strategy.  
Although even unitary SCE is less restrictive than Nash equilibrium, it is by no 
means vacuous. For example, Fudenberg & Levine (2005) showed that self-confirming 
equilibrium  is  enough  for  the  no-trade  theorem.  Basically,  if  players  make  a  purely 
speculative trade, some of them have to lose, and they will notice this. 
                                                 
35 More generally,  unitary  SCE  with independent beliefs are outcome-equivalent to Nash equilibria in 
games with observed deviators. Kamada (2008) fixes an error in the original Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) 
proof of this, which relied in the claim that that “consistent” unitary, independent SCE were outcome-
equivalent to Nash equilibria. The definition given of consistency was too weak for this to be true, Kamada 
give the appropriate definition. We turn now to the question of when there is enough experimentation to lead to a 
a stronger notion of equilibrium than SCE. Fudenberg &  Kreps (1994) showed that non-
Nash  outcomes  cannot  persist  if  at  every  action  is  played  infinitely  often  at  every 
information  on  the  path  of  play,  and  observe  that  refinements  such  as  sequential 
equilibrium  require  in  addition  that  every  action  is  played  infinitely  often  at  other 
information sets as well.  If behavior rules satisfy their “MME” condition, then actions 
are  indeed  played  infinitely  often  on  the  path  of  play,  and  moreover  every  action  is 
played infinitely often in games of perfect information; for this reason the only stable 
outcomes in such games are the backwards induction solutions.  However, they point out 
that the MME condition requires more experimentation than may be plausible, as it is not 
clear  that  players  at  seldomly-reached  information  sets  will  choose  to  do  that  much 
experimentation. This is related to the fact that if each player experiments at rate 1/t in 
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(1993b) examine endogenous experimentation. They derive experimentation rates from 
the  play  of  patient  expected-utility  maximizers,  and  show  that  there  is  enough 
experimentation to rule out non-Nash outcomes when the discount factor is close enough 
to 1, but they do not address the question of whether players will experiment enough to 
rule out outcomes that are not subgame perfect. 
Noldeke & Samuelson (1993) considered a large-population model of learning  
where “experiments” occur when the players “mutate” and change their beliefs and thus their actions. In most periods players do not update their beliefs at all, but with some 
fixed probability a player receives a “learn draw,” observes the terminal nodes in all  
matches, and changes his beliefs about play at all reached  information sets to match the 
frequencies in his observation.  In games of perfect information, this leads to a refinement 
of SCE, and in some special cases it leads to subgame perfection.  
Dubey  &  Haimanko  (2004)  studied  a  similar model  of  learning  in  a  game  of 
perfect information, where agents play best responses to their beliefs, and beliefs are 
updated to be consistent with observed data; the model is quite flexible as to what this 
means, as it allows players to consider only the most recent observation or older data as 
well. They show that the system converges to a (unitary) self-confirming equilibrium 
with independent beliefs; because this is a game with identified deviators, the steady state 
is thus outcome-equivalent to a Nash equilibrium.  
The belief-based models mentioned above place no constraints on the players’ 
beliefs other than consistency with observed data, and in particular are agnostic about 
what prior information any player might have about the payoff functions of the others. 
Rubinstein & Wolinksy (1994) and Dekel et al. (1999) added the restriction that players 
do know the payoff functions of the others, leading to the concepts of ‘rationalizable 
conjectural  equilibrium”  and  “rationalizable  self-confirming  equilibrium.”  To  see  the 
difference that this makes, consider Dekel et al’s variation on the game Fudenberg and 
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Here if x  and y  have the same sign, then player 3 has a conditionally dominant 
strategy, and so if players 1 and 2 assign high probability to a neighborhood of 3’s true 
payoffs then they must have very similar beliefs about his play. In this case (A,a) is not 
the outcome of any RSCE. However, if x and y have opposite signs, then even common 
knowledge of 3’s payoff function does not imply common beliefs about his play, and 
RSCE allows (A,a).
36  Another variation on this theme is the SCE-motivated robustness 
notion  of  Espinoza  (2008).  He  allowed  players  to  be  uncertain  about  hierarchies  of 
beliefs,  but  these  hierarchies  of  beliefs  are  required  to  be  consistent  with  players’ 
knowledge of equilibrium play. Rationalizability, Nash equilibrium and SCE are special 
cases. Despite the broad range of possibilities allowed, the solution may be characterized 
by an iterative elimination procedure. 
Lehrer & Solan’s  (2007) “partially specified equilibrium” is a variant of SCE 
where players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. A leading example is the trivial 
                                                 
36 Dekel et al. only defined RSCE for the unitary case; the appropriate heterogeneous definition, and its 
consequences, is still unresolved.  partition which provides no information at all. While this on its own would allow a great 
multiplicity of beliefs (and only rule out the play of dominated strategies) the solution 
concept  pins  down  beliefs  by  the  worst-case  assumption  that  players  maximize  their 
expected payoff against the confirmed belief that gives the lowest payoff. With this trivial 
partition,  the  unique  PSE  in  a  symmetric  coordination  game  is  for  each  player  to 
randomize ½- ½ , which is not a SCE. At the other extreme, with the discrete partition on 
terminal nodes, the PSE must be a SCE. 
3B. Solution Concepts and Steady-State Analysis 
  Self-confirming equilibrium is based on the idea that player should have correct 
beliefs  about  probability distributions that  they  observe  sufficiently  often,  so  that  the 
specification of the “observation technology” is essential. The original definition of SCE 
assumes that players observe the terminal node that is reached, but in some settings it is 
natural to assume that they observe less than this. For example in a sealed-bid auction, 
players might only observe the winning bid and the identity of the winning bidder, but 
observe neither the losing bids nor the types of the other players.  In the setting of a static 
Bayesian game, Dekel et al. (2004) extended the definition of SCE to allow for these 
sorts of coarser maps from outcomes of the game to observations.  If players do observe 
the outcome of each round of play, meaning both the actions taken and the realization of 
Nature's  move,  the  set  of  self-confirming  equilibria  is  the  same  as  the  set  of  Nash 
equilibria with a common prior; Dekel et al. pointed out that the same conclusion applies 
if players observe the actions played and there are private values, so that each player’s 
private information relates only to their own payoff. When players do not observe the 
actions played, or there are not private values, the set of self-confirming equilibria can include non-Nash outcomes. Dekel et al. argued that Nash equilibrium without a common 
prior is difficult to justify as the long-run result of a learning process, because it takes 
very special assumptions for the set of such equilibria to coincide with the set of steady 
states that could arise from learning. Intuitively, Nash equilibrium requires that players 
have correct beliefs about the strategies their opponents use to map their types to their 
actions, and in order for repeated observations to lead players to learn the distribution of 
opponents’ strategies, the signals observed at the end of each round of play must be 
sufficiently informative.  Such information will tend to lead players to also have correct 
and hence identical beliefs about the distribution of Nature’s moves.   
  While  SCE  assumes  that  the  players’  inferences  are  consistent  with  their 
observations,  a  related  strand  of  this  literature  assumes  that  players  make  systematic 
mistakes in inference. The leading example here is the Jehiel (2005) notion of analogy-
based expectations equilibrium or “ABEE,” where players group the opponents’ decision 
nodes into “analogy classes,” with the player believing that play at each node in a given 
class  is  identical.  Given  this,  the  player’s  beliefs  must  then  correspond  to  the  actual 
average of play across the nodes in the analogy class.  
  This  is  most  easily  illustrated  by  an  example.  Consider  a  game  of  perfect  
information, where Nature moves first, choosing state A with probability 2/3 or state B 
with probability 1/3, player 1 moves second, choosing either action A1 or action B1, with 
player 2 moving last, again choosing either action A2 or action B2. We will suppose for 
illustrative purposes that player 2 is a dummy receiving a zero payoff no matter what, and 
that player 2 chooses A in state A and B in state B regardless of what player 1 did. Player 
1 gets one if his action matches that of player 2 and zero if not. Then in state A player 1 should play A1 and in state B player 1 should play B1.  However, if player 1 views all 
nodes of player 2 following a given move as belonging to an analogy class, then he  
believes that player 2 will play A2 2/3rds the time, regardless of the state, and so player 1 
will play A1  regardless of the state. This is an example of an ABEE. 
  If player 1 observes and remembers the outcome of each game, then as he learns 
that player 2 plays A2 2/3rds of the time,  he will also get evidence that player 2’s play is 
correlated with the state. Thus if he is a rational Bayesian and assigns positive probability 
to  player  2  observing  the  state,  he  should  eventually  learn  that  this  is  the  case. 
Conversely, even a rational player 1 could maintain the belief that 2’s play is independent 
of the state provided that he has a doctrinaire  prior that assigns probability 1 to this 
independence.    Such  doctrinaire  priors  may  seem  unreasonable,  but  they  are  an 
approximation of circumstances where player 1 has a very strong prior conviction that 
player 2’s play is independent of the state. In this case it will take a very long time to 
learn that this is not true. 
37  
  An  alternative  explanation  for  analogy-based  reasoning  is  that  players  are 
boundedly rational, so that they are unable to remember all that they have observed, 
perhaps because at an earlier stage they chose not to expend the resources required for a 
better memory.  In our example this would correspond to player 1 only being able to 
remember the fraction of time that 2 played A2 and not the correlation of this play with 
                                                 
37 Ettinger &  Jehiel (2005) explicitly recognized this issue, saying “From the learning perspective…it is 
important that a (player 1) does not play herself too often the game as the observation of past performance 
might trigger the belief that there is something wrong with (player 1)’s theory.” the state; this is analogous to SCE when the player 1’s end-of-stage observation is simply 
player 2’s action, and includes neither Nature’s move nor player 1’s realized payoff.
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  Ettinger  &  Jehiel  (2005)  considered  how  a  fully  rational  opponent  might 
manipulate  the  misperceptions  of  an  opponent  who  reasons  by  faulty  analogy.  They 
referred to this as “deception” and give a number of applications, as well as relating the 
idea  to  the  “Fundamental  Attribution  Error”  of  social  psychology.  Jehiel  &  Koessler 
(2008) provided additional applications in the context of one-shot two-player games of 
incomplete information, and study in particular the conditions for successful coordination 
in a variety of  games.  They  also study information transmission, and show that with 
analogy based reasoning, the no-trade theorem may fail, in contrast to the positive result  
under SCE. These many applications, while interesting, suggest that very little is ruled 
out  by  ABEE  absent  some  constraints  on  the  allowed  analogy  classes.  Developing  a 
taxonomy of ABEE’s implications could be useful, but it seems more important to gain a 
sense of which sorts of  false analogies are relevant for which applications and ideally to 
endogeneize the analogy classes.  
  ABEE is closely related to Eyster & Rabin’s (2005) notion of cursed equilibrium. 
This focuses specifically on Bayesian games, and assumes “analogy” classes of the form 
that  opponents’  play  is  independent  of  their  types.  However,  they  introduce  a 
“cursedness” parameter, and assume that each player’s beliefs are a convex combination 
of the “analogy” based expectations and the correct expectations. When the cursedness 
parameter equals zero, we have the usual Bayesian equilibrium, when it is one we have in 
effect ABEE. Less obviously, by changing the information structure, it is possible to 
                                                 
38 Since player 1 does observe Nature’s move in the course of play, this form of SCE incorporates a form of represent cursed equilibria as ABEE for intermediate parameter values as well. Miettinen 
(2007) shows how to find the correct information partition, and proves the equivalence. 
ABEE is also related to the “valuation equilibrium” of Jehiel & Samet (2005), where 
beliefs about continuation values take the place of beliefs about moves by opponents and 
Nature; the relationship between the outcomes allowed by these two solution concepts 
has not yet been determined.  
  In a related but different direction is the work of Esponda (2008). He supposed 
that  there  are  two  sorts  of  players:  sophisticated  players  whose  beliefs  are  self-
confirming,  and  naïve  players  whose  marginal  beliefs  about  actions  and  payoff 
realizations are consistent with the data but who can have incorrect beliefs about the joint 
distribution. He then showed how in an adverse selection problem, the usual problem of 
self-selection is exacerbated. Interestingly, whether a bias can arise in equilibrium in this 
model is endogenous. 
  The work of Acemoglu et al. (2007) studied when rational Bayesian agents can 
maintain  different  beliefs  even  when  faced  with a  common  infinite  data  set.  In  their 
model, players are learning about a fixed unknown parameter, and update their beliefs 
using  different  likelihood  functions.  The  agents’  observations  do  not  identify  the 
underlying parameter, which is why the agents can maintain different beliefs about the 
parameter even though they asymptotically agree about the distribution of signals. Of 
course  this  lack  of  identification  only  matters  if  the  unknown  parameter  is  payoff-
                                                                                                                                                 
imperfect recall. relevant; loosely speaking, the assumptions in Acemolgu et al. correspond to the case in 
Dekel et al. (2004) where agents observe neither Nature’s move nor their own payoffs.
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3C. Learning Backwards Induction 
  Now we turn to the question of when there will be enough experimentation to lead 
to restrictions beyond Nash equilibrium. As we discussed above, the earlier literature 
gave partial results in this direction. The more recent literature has focused on the special 
case of games of perfect information, and the question of when learning leads to the 
backwards induction outcome. 
  In a game of perfect information with generic payoffs, so that there are no ties, we 
should  expect  that  many  reasonable  learning  procedures  will  converge  to  subgame 
perfection provided that there is “enough” experimentation, and in particular if players 
experiment  with  a  fixed  non-vanishing  probability.  In  this  case,  since  all  the  final 
decision  nodes  are  reached  infinitely  often,  players  will  learn  to  optimize  there; 
eventually players who move at the immediately preceding nodes will learn to optimize 
against  the  final-node  play,  and  so  forth.    This  backwards  induction  result,  not 
surprisingly, is quite robust to the details of the process of learning. For example, Jehiel 
& Samet (2005) considered a setting where players use a valuation function to assess the 
relative  merit  of  different  actions  at  a  node.  Valuations  are  determined  according  to 
historical  averages  the  moves  have  earned,  so  this  without  experimentation  this  is 
equivalent to fictitious play on the agent-normal form.  When a small fixed amount of 
exogenous experimentation or “trembles” is imposed on the players, every information 
                                                 
39 Acemoglu et al. (2007) suggest that the assumptions are a good description of learning whether Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction. set is reached infinitely often, so any steady state must approximate a Nash equilibrium 
of the agent-normal form and thus subgane-perfect; Jehiel and Samet showed moreover 
that that play does indeed converge, and provide some additional results about attaining 
individually rational payoffs in games more general than games of perfect information. 
Indeed, this is true in general games, regardless of how the other players play.
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In a different direction,  Laslier  & Walliser  (2002) considered the “cumulative 
proportional  reinforcement”  learning  rule.  Here  a  player  chooses  a  move  with  a 
probability proportional to the cumulative payoff she obtained in the past with that move. 
Again, when all player employ this learning rule, the backwards induction equilibrium 
always results in the long-run. Hart (2002) considered a model of myopic adjustment 
with  mutations  in  a  large  population.  Players  are  generally  locked  in  to  particular 
strategies, but are occasionally allowed to make changes. When they do so, they with 
very high probability choose to best-respond to the current population of players; and 
with low probability “mutate” to a randomly chosen strategy. One key assumption is that 
the game is played in what he calls the “gene normal form,” which is closely related to 
the agent normal form: in the gene normal form, instead of a separate player at each 
information set, there is a separate population of players at each information set, so best 
responses and mutations are chosen independently across nodes. Hart showed that the 
unique invariant distribution of the Markov evolutionary process converges to placing all 
weight on the backward induction equilibrium in the limit as the mutation rate goes to 
                                                 
40 In the special case of a “win/lose” player who gets a payoff of either zero or one,  and who has a strategy 
that gives him one against any opponent strategy, Jehiel and Samet showed that there is a time after which 
the  win-lose player always wins, even if the valuation is simply given by last period’s payoff. 
 
 zero  and  the  population  size  goes  to  infinity,  provided  that  the  expected  number  of 
mutations per period is bounded away from 0; Gorodeisky (2006) showed that this last 
condition is not necessary.  
  All  of  the  papers  with  positive  results  assume,  in  effect,  exogenously  given 
experimentation. However, the incentives to experiment depend on how useful the results 
will be: if an opportunity to experiment arises infrequently, then there is little incentive to 
actually carry out the experiment. This has implications for backwards induction explored 
in Fudenberg & Levine (2006), who re-examined the steady-state model of Fudenberg & 
Levine (1993b) in subclass of games of perfect information where each player moves 
only  once  on  any  path  of  play.  The  key  observation  is  that  for  some  prior  beliefs 
experimentation  takes  place  only  on  the  equilibrium  path,  so  a  relatively  sharp 
characterization of the limit equilibrium path (the limit of the steady state paths as first 
the lifetimes go to infinity and then the discount factor goes to 1) is possible. A limit 
equilibrium  path  must  be  the  path  of  a  Nash  equilibrium,  but  must  satisfy  also  the 
property  that  one  step  off  the  equilibrium  path,  play  follows  a  self-confirming 
equilibrium. In other words, wrong or “superstitious” beliefs can persist, provided that 
they are at least two steps off the equilibrium path, so that they follow deviations by two 
players. The reason is that the second player has little incentive to experiment since the 
first deviator deviates infrequently, so information generated by the second experiment 
has little value as the situation is not expected to recur for a long time. 
3D. Non-equilibrium Learning in Macroeconomics  
  Learning, especially passive learning, has long played a role in macroeconomic 
theory. Lucas’s (1976) original rationale for rational expectations theory was that it is implausible to explain the business cycle by assuming that people repeatedly make the 
same  mistakes.  The  Lucas  critique,  that  individual  behavior  under  one  policy  regime 
cannot be reasonably thought to remain unchanged when the regime changes, is closely 
connected  to  the  idea  of  self-confirming  equilibrium  (Fudenberg  &  Levine  (2007)). 
Indeed, in recent years, the idea of self-confirming equilibrium has had many applications 
in  macroeconomics,  so  much  so  that  it  is  the  central  topic  of  Sargent’s  2008  AEA 
Presidential Address. As this address is an excellent survey of the area, we limit ourselves 
here  to  outlining  the  broad  issues  of  related  to  learning  that  have  arisen  in 
macroeconomics. 
  One  of  the  important  uses  of  learning  theory  in  macroeconomics  is  to  use 
dynamic  stability  as  a  way  to  select  between  multiple  rational  expectations  or  self-
confirming equilibria. Several learning dynamics have been studied, most notably the 
robust  learning  methods  of  Hansen  and  Sargent  (2001).  A  good  set  of  examples  of 
equilibrium  selection  using  learning  dynamics  can  be  found  in  Evans  &  Honkapohja 
(2003).  Much  of  the  area  was  pioneered  by  Marcet  &  Sargent  (1998a,b),  and  recent 
contributions include Cho et al.  (2002) and Sargent & Williams (2005) who examined 
the dynamics of escaping from “Nash” inflation. 
  The application of SCE to study the role of misperceptions in macroeconomics 
has also been important. Historically, the government’s misperception of the natural rate 
hypothesis played a key role in the formulation of economic policy. This is discussed by 
Sargent  (1999),  Cogley  &  Sargent  (2005)  and  Primiceri  (2006)  among  others.  The 
narrower problem of commodity money and the melting of coins has also been studied 
using the tools of self-confirming equilibrium by Sargent and Velde (2002).   Alesina & Angeletos (2005) used SCE to analyze the political economy of tax 
policy.  They  observe  that  if  wealth  is  due  to  luck  optimal  insurance  implies  a 
confiscatory tax is efficient. On the other hand if wealth is due to effort transfers should 
be low to encourage effort. But even if wealth is due to effort, if taxes are confiscatory, 
effort does not generate wealth, only luck does so beliefs that only luck matters will be 
self-confirming.  They  then  used  the  resulting  multiplicity  of  SCE  to  reconcile  cross-
country correlation of perceptions about wealth formation and tax policy. In a similar 
vein, Giordani & Ruta (2008) show how incorrect but self-confirming expectations about 
the skills of immigrants can explain cross-country variation in immigration policy. 
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